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The recent globalization in Korea was forced by the 1997 economic crisis and 
subsequent IMF-mandated neoliberal reform, which has prompted patriotism, 
concern with national identity and nationalism. Nationalism has also been 
promoted by the 'sunshine' policy toward North Korea. The rise of nationalism 
has provided young Koreans with an opportunity to take a critical look at imported 
Western culture as well as their own indigenous culture. At the same time they 
have acquired more cultural capital than older Koreans and tend to consume 
popular culture according to their own tastes and considering its quality. The 
neoliberal reform has also made the Korean culture industry and cultural markets 
bigger and more open, so that not only Korean consumers have more choices, but 
also Korean cultural products become more visible in East Asian markets, creating 
'Korean wave.' Other countries in this region have followed suit, and exchange 
of cultural products among them has surged dramatically, suggesting an East 
Asian Popular Culture in the Making. And it can be a possible candidate for an 
alternative globalization which refers to the flow from the peripheral or non- 
Western to the West.
Key Words: Globalization, Nationalism, Popular Culture, Culture Industry, 
Regional Culture, East Asia.
INTRODUCTION
A controversial movie has hit the Korean cinema market in the 
summer of 2007. Even before its release on the 1st of August, the movie 
“D-War” (or “Dragon War” in overseas markets) was controversial, 
because in many ways it was different from previous Korean movies. 
It was a block-buster with the production cost of about 30 billion Korean 
won, the most expensive in the history of Korean movie-making. It was 
a fantasy based on a traditional Korean legend, and utilized extensively 
cutting-edge computer graphics. It was filmed mostly in the United 
* This is a revised version of paper presented at the 30th Anniversary Conference, 
Association for Korean Studies in Europe, Dourdan, France, 16-20 April, 2007. I am 
grateful for comments from an anonymous reviewer of this journal.
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States, featuring American actors and actresses who speak in English in 
the movie. It was contracted with major international film distributors 
that more than 1500 cinemas in the U. S. would show the movie in 
September (Joongang Ilbo, September 4, 2007).
The producer-director of the movie, Sim Hyeong-Rae, whose previous 
movie with a similar style to this one was a total failure, was very 
emotional as well as proud in the movie’s publicity interview with the 
mass media, which sparked hot debates among movie critics and 
netizens. Some critics who saw the movie in the preview criticized the 
producer as trying to appeal to sympathy and patriotism of Korean 
movie-goers with a low-quality movie. Others indicated that its story 
was loose and the acting of actors and actresses was problematic. 
Despite, or maybe because of, these criticisms, more than four hundred 
thousand Koreans watched it within a week of its release, and almost 
8 million viewers within the first month (Joongang Ilbo, September 4, 
2007). At the same time, netizens began to attack the critics so massively 
and threateningly that it was almost impossible to speak openly against 
the movie.
This incidence seems to reveal some of the important features of 
Korean popular culture today. A huge investment in a movie, an 
extensive use of most advanced computer technology, large contracts 
with overseas cinema markets, and an immense support (partly out of 
patriotism or nationalism) of Korean public in spite of some criticism 
against the movie are relatively new in the Korean cultural scene. It 
would have been impossible even to imagine a Korean movie of this 
scale a decade ago. And this cultural change can be attributed to the 
recent accelerated globalization, which was precipitated by the 1997 
economic crisis and subsequent neo-liberal reform, and by the rapid 
penetration of digital technology into people’s everyday life. 
The economic and technological changes occurred in the last ten years 
have not only incorporated Korea1 more deeply into the world system 
but also exerted great impacts on other, especially cultural, aspect of 
Korea society. The culture industry has grown rapidly, nationalism has 
surged, and cultural tastes of the people have changed to reflect 
advanced standard of living and cultural modernity. These cultural 
changes pose a challenge to the West-centered theory of cultural 
imperialism and suggest an alternative globalization process. The 
purpose of this study is to examine changes occurred recently in the 
1 ‘Korea’ denotes South Korea only in this paper, unless indicated otherwise.
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Korean popular culture in the process of accelerated globalization and 
to interpret them in terms of the recent theories of globalization. 
THEORIES OF CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION
Globalization is usually defined as the movement or flow of objects, 
signs and people (or as the material, political and symbolic exchanges) 
across regions and intercontinental space, and the connectivity or 
interdependence among them (Held et al., 1999: 16; Tomlinson, 1999: 22). 
Cultural globalization refers to the cultural dimension of globalization, 
distinguished from economic and political dimensions. But these three 
dimensions of globalization are so closely connected that understanding 
one dimension requires consideration of others. 
Cultural globalization has a long history which goes back to the era 
before the modern. But contemporary process of cultural globalization 
has been driven by establishment of new global cultural infrastructures, 
an increase in the intensity, volumes and speed of cultural exchange and 
communication, the rise of Western popular culture, the dominance of 
multinational culture industries,and a shift in the geography of global 
cultural interaction (Held et al., 1999: 341). 
The globalization process is also approached in terms of changing 
conditions of capitalism. For example, James H. Mittelman (2000) traces 
the origin of the present phase of globalization to the deep recession 
experienced by the Western countries in the 1970s. It was a turning point 
in the history of capitalism that the recession was met by new strategies 
for restructuring production from the Fordist to the post-Fordist one 
which emphasizes more flexible, capital-intensive and technology- 
intensive operations. The intensification of these strategies has resulted in 
restructuring, deregulation, privatization and enhancing competitiveness. 
According to Mittelman, free-market competition has been elevated to the 
neo-liberalist ideology, which has been adopted by such international 
organizations as the IMF, World Bank and the WTO.
In a similar vein, Martin Albrow suggests that capitalism is a major 
factor in the opposition to state definition and control and for free flow 
of goods and services across borders and boundaries (Albrow, 1996: 
142-143). Mauro F. Guillen notes that globalization is an ideology, often 
“associated with neoliberalism and with technological solution to 
economic development and reform” (Guillen, 2001: 236). Ramesh Mishra 
also argues that globalization is not only the transnational ideology of 
neoliberalism but also a process to extend and consolidate the hegemony 
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of Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism world-wide (Mishra, 1999: 7-8).
These approaches that connect globalization with the neoliberal 
ideology in association with recent changes in capitalist economy have 
one thing in common: imperialism. Indeed, imperialism is regarded as 
an earlier model of cultural globalization by many scholars (See, for 
example, Tomlinson, 1991; Schiller, 1998; Crane, 2002; Curren and Park, 
2000). According to Diana Crane, the theory of cultural imperialism is 
the best known model of cultural globalization which emerges in the 
1960s as part of a Marxist critique of advanced capitalist cultures, 
especially its emphasis on consumerism and mass communication. The 
key to this model is cultural domination or the imposition of a particular 
nation’s beliefs, values, knowledge, behavioral norms, and style of life 
by core nations over peripheral ones. Because contemporary cultural 
domination is usually carried out in the field of media by transnational 
media corporations, it is often called media imperialism.2 Cultural 
imperialism or media imperialism is mostly a form of ‘intended’ 
globalization and has the homogenizing effect on culture.
But the theory of media imperialism has been challenged in many 
fronts. One criticism argues that the flow of global communication is not 
unidirectional, but multidirectional, and that global media corporations 
have to accept local cultures and to collaborate with local enterprises for 
their continuous expansion. Other critiques emphasize local resistance 
against cultural domination, instances of which include resistance to 
American cultural products on the part of consumers, and government's 
efforts to protect local culture and domestic media industry by such 
means as subsidy, investment allocation and ban on imports (Curren and 
Park, 2000).
An alternative model to cultural imperialism is the cultural flow or 
network model which posits that cultural transmission does not 
necessarily originate in the same place or flow in the same direction. In 
other words, there is no clearly defined center or periphery; receivers can 
be originators. The effect of the cultural flows is likely to be “cultural 
hybridization rather than homogenization” (Crane, 2002: 4). In relation 
to this model, Peter Berger notes “the increasingly significant 
phenomenon of alternative globalization, that is, cultural movements 
with a global outreach originating outside the Western world and indeed 
2 Some scholars elect to use the concept media domination differently from cultural 
domination. But the two concepts are closely related, if not the same. See John Tomlinson 
for detailed discussion on the relationship between these two concepts (Tomlinson, 1991: 
20-23).
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imparting on the latter,” for which Japan is a principal example. (Berger, 
2002: 12). There is also what Berger calls ‘subglobalization’ which refers 
to cultural movements within a region rather than with a global reach 
(Berger, 2002: 14). Others call this phenomenon ‘regionalization,’ which 
can be found in some regions of the world.
Crane (2002) suggests two more models of cultural globalization, 
which focus on responses to cultural globalization by various actors. One 
is reception theory, which deals with public's responses to cultural 
globalization. The theory hypothesizes the active response of audiences 
to the transnational media and the different interpretations of the same 
materials by different groups. Thus, globalization of culture does not 
breed the homogenized world culture; instead multiculturalism is a 
dominant trend, with national or local identities being relatively intact.
The other model, proposed by Crane, focuses on various strategies by 
nations, cities and organizations “for preserving and protecting inherited 
cultures, regenerating traditional cultures, resisting cultural globalization, 
and altering or transforming local and national cultures for global 
consumption” (Crane, 2002: 4). According to this perspective, cultural 
globalization involves competition, and negotiation in the process of 
preserving, positioning, or projecting their cultures in global space. Thus, 
cultural globalization is viewed not as an orderly, unidirectional process, 
but as a disorderly one fraught with tension, competition and conflict. 
But a culture can be strong or weak,   according to Samuel Huntington 
(Berger, 2002: 15), and the capacity of governments or organizations to 
cope with globalization differs. Thus, there can be ‘managed’ or 
controlled globalization, or uncontrolled or forced globalization.   
We can also approach cultural globalization in terms of the forms of 
the response. One of the more extreme forms of response is 
ethnocentrism which regards their own culture as the best and rejects 
other cultures as inferior or evil. A more common form is nationalism, 
which promotes national pride and often leads to a revitalization of 
indigenous cultural tradition. In any case, cultural globalization poses 
“the great challenge of pluralism: the breakdown of taken for granted 
traditions and the opening up of multiple options for beliefs, values, and 
lifestyles,” and one takes more often a middle position between 
“acceptance and militant resistance, between global homogeneity and 
parochial isolation” (Berger, 2002: 16).
The theories or models of cultural globalization discussed so far are 
not exclusive from each other in an empirical setting. One is most likely 
to find multiple factors for, diverse responses to, and many forms of, 
182 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY
globalization in one case. It is mostly a matter of the degree of 
appropriateness to choose one or other from the many theoretical 
approaches in an empirical research. In explaining the Korean case of 
cultural globalization, I will be theoretically as well as empirically 
selective and attempt to highlight some of the important features that 
may contribute not only to better understanding of the process of recent 
cultural globalization in Korea, but also to refinement of the existing 
theories of globalization. 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION 
IN KOREA
Korea had been a ‘hermit kingdom’ until the last decade of 19th 
century, when it finally opened its doors to the outside world after a 
long period of seclusion. At that time the Chosun dynasty, the last 
kingdom in Korea, took a policy of closure to foreign, especially Western 
influence, but increasing demands from Western powers as well as Japan 
to open its doors were mounted and could not be resisted by the already 
weaken dynasty. The dynasty had to open its doors and Western 
cultures began to enter Korea mostly through Western missionaries and 
Westernized Japanese. 
In 1910, Japan forcefully colonized and ruled Korea until 1945. Japan 
was already modernized and tried to transform Korea into a modern 
country resembling the contemporary Japanese society. As a result, 
Japanese popular culture which may be called Japanized Western culture 
began to be brought into Korea massively, and soon became a dominant 
form of popular culture replacing the traditional Korean one. In a sense, 
the history of modern Korean popular culture started in earnest in the 
early years of colonial period when such modern forms of mass media 
as newspapers, magazines, radios, films, and phonographs were 
introduced for the first time in Korea (INC, 1977).
It was a forced globalization or cultural imperialism by the colonial 
power. It was also a lopsided one with Japanese culture dominating the 
Korean indigenous one. Since the colonial period, the traditional culture 
has no longer been a mainstay in Korea society, but has been retreated 
to the status of museum pieces. 
After liberation from Japan in 1945, American military government 
ruled Korea for three years, during which major institutions were further 
transformed into modern Western ones.  In 1950 a civil war broke out 
between the communist North and the liberal South, where the American 
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military as a major part of the UN allied forces fought for the South. 
The war ended in 1953, but the American troops has since then stayed 
in the South, along with American influence. As a consequence many 
Koreans have chances to have direct contacts with American popular 
culture and internalize the anti-communist and pro-American ideology. 
For most Koreans, America has been a close ally and a dream land. 
Naturally American popular culture has been imported with little 
resistance and has since been prevalent in Korea. 
On the other hand, Japanese influence on Korean popular culture has 
rapidly waned after decolonization, due primarily to the Korean 
government's ban on the importation of Japanese popular culture. 
However, it was smuggled in little by little through various channels.  
Because of this illegal importation and of the remnants of the Japanese 
influence from the colonial period, one could still find the Japanese tint 
in some of the Korean popular culture (Kim, 2003; Yoon and Na, 2005a).
Cultural globalization in Korea, however, had been very much limited 
until 1987, when democracy was finally restored after almost three 
decades of military dictatorship, due to the ban on import of foreign 
cultural products, censorship, and control of foreign travel. It was only 
1989 that Korean nationals were allowed to travel overseas freely without 
any restriction. As a consequence, the number of foreign travel has 
increased drastically from about 1.5 million in 1993 to over 5 million in 
2000 and 15 million in 2006. Pubic performance for art or entertainment 
purposes had long been censored by the government. The Ethics 
Committee for Public Performance, (a government agency which was 
turned to private later), was established in 1976, and screened the script 
or scenario before a performance and decided whether it could be 
performed or not. However, in a landmark decision, the Constitution 
Court ruled that the prior censorship was unconstitutional. As a 
consequence, the prior censorship was formally abolished in 1999. 
Korean government has long had a policy to protect its cultural market 
from outside intrusion. During the 1980s, however there had also been 
mounting pressure from the West, especially from the United States, to 
open cultural markets in Korea. Also the 1994 Uruguay Round, the 
membership of OECD in 1996, and the economic crisis in 1997 have 
made the Korean government to open its cultural market gradually.  
In the mid-1990s, Korea entered into the new (or second) phase of 
globalization.3 The Kim Young Sam government which was elected in 
3 For a detailed account of this second phase of globalization in Korea, see, Yang (2005).
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1992 as the first truly civilian government took neoliberalism as its basic 
ideology and pursued further globalization by joining the WTO in 1995 
and the OECD in 1996. Liberalization of the economy is at least partly 
responsible for the 1997 financial crisis, which forced the Korean 
government to ask the IMF for a bailout. As a string attached to the 
bailout, the IMF imposed on Korean government a series of policy advice 
which emphasizes liberalization, deregulation and privatization. 
The Kim Dae Jung government which succeeded the Kim Young Sam 
government in 1998, had no choice but to follow the IMF mandate of 
structural reform, and was successful in overcoming the economic crisis. 
But in the course of the reform, Korea underwent profound changes not 
only in economic institutions and practices but also in social 
organizations and cultural values. Korean society has never been so 
thoroughly swayed by the liberal economic logic, represented by such 
values as efficiency, free competition, material wealth, globalization, and 
survival of the fittest. We are now witnessing in Korea the fast demise 
of the traditional socio-cultural system supported by Confucian values. 
The second phase of globalization may also be characterized by 
dramatic expansion of information and communications industries and 
by extensive penetration of such information technologies as personal 
computers, mobile phones, satellitetelevision, and the internet into the 
everyday lives of average Koreans. This information revolution has 
greatly facilitated cultural globalization by providing an almost 
unlimited access to foreign culture. 
But globalization in this phase may be called a forced one, because 
it was imposed by the IMF. It has restructured the culture industry, and 
changed institutions and cultural values from the traditional Confucian 
ones to modern Western ones. Because it was forced by a foreign 
institution, there have been various types of resistance on the part of 
Korean people.
In the next sections, I will discuss some of the effects of, and responses 
to, this phase of globalization. Among the many I will focus on the 
transformation of cultural industry, nationalistic responses, changing 
patterns of cultural consumption, and the so-called ‘Korean Wave’ as a 
symptom of East Asian regionalization.
NATIONALISTIC RESPONSES TO RECENT GLOBALIZATION
The 1997 economic crisis has imposed not only economic hardship but 
also damaged national pride seriously. Since the 1960s, Korean economy 
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has grown almost 10 percent annually, reaching ten thousand dollars of 
per capita income in 1990s, and been regarded by many students of 
development as one of the most successful case of peripheral 
development along with other members of the little tigers in East Asia 
including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Koreans were also proud 
that they hosted the Olympic Games in 1988. Thus the economic crisis 
and the IMF intervention were almost unbearable for the proud Koreans, 
and led to the renewed rise of nationalism and patriotism.
The gold collection movement in 1997 and 1998 is an early example 
of the patriotic reactions to the crisis. The purpose of the movement was 
to ease the foreign currency crisis by collecting gold from voluntary 
donators. It was started firstly by the public prosecutor’s office and the 
Saemaeul women’s club, but soon joined by more than hundred 
non-government organizations. Within a few months more than one 
million donators joined the movement by donating their golden jewels, 
golden plates, even golden teeth and an Olympic gold medal. The total 
amount of collected gold was exceeding sixteen tons, worth 160 million 
US dollars (Donga Ilbo, 1998).
Along with patriotism, national identity was also an important 
concern, evidenced by: the unprecedented popularity of television lecture 
series on Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism and Taoism the 
popular catchphrase “The body and the land are inseparable” (sintobuli), 
which means that indigenous products, especially agricultural products, 
instead of foreign ones, are good for people; a number of best sellers 
and popular movies that deal with traditional cultural heritages or 
historical episodes. 
These reactions to globalization are only partially responsible for the 
rise of nationalism. The Kim Dae Jung government’s so-called ‘sunshine 
policy’ toward the communist North Korea has an effect of stimulating 
nationalism. Until very recently the anti-communist ideology was (and 
probably is for many Koreans) the dominant ideology in Korea, and the 
communist North Korea was regarded as a main enemy, even though 
for a long time the North and the South Korea had been one nation. 
The sunshine policy which aimed at establishing better relationship 
between the two Koreas, and eventually at their reunification, has 
facilitated increasing contacts and exchanges between them. As a result, 
a substantial portion of Korean population began to change their 
attitudes toward North Korea and to see the North-South Korean 
relationship from a nationalistic point of view rather than from the 
viewpoint of cold-war ideology. 
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In fact, a recent survey provides an empirical support for this change. 
According to the 2005 KGSS (Korean General Social Survey) results, a 
little less than 60 percent of the respondents regard North Korea as a 
partner for cooperation or support, in contrast to 36 percent considering 
it an enemy or a state to guard against. If the survey was conducted 
10 years ago, a majority would have answered that North Korea was 
a main enemy. The survey findings also reveal that about 27 percent of 
the respondents choose North Korea out of the five countries as the 
country they feel most close to. The USA was the most favored country 
by a little less than half of the respondents. North Korea was ahead of 
Japan and China in this measure. There is another question in the survey 
that directly measures the degree of national pride. According to the 
survey results, almost three quarters of the respondents were proud of 
being Korean, in comparison to only a quarter of negative answers. There 
are age variations in these results: respondents in their 20s and 30s tend 
to show more favorable attitudes toward North Korea than those aged 
more than 40, indicating that attitude changes are more visible among 
the youth (Kim et al., 2006).
‘One example of nationalistic occurrences in recent years is the 
enthusiastic supports for the Korean football team during the 
Korea-Japan World Cup Games in 2002. It is probably unprecedented 
that so many people gather together to watch and cheer the Korean team 
during the games. Whenever the Korean team had a match, not only tens 
of thousand flocked together in the stadium, but also hundreds of 
thousands gathered before the big screens installed in public squares. 
Because the supporters wore red shirts they were called the ’reds.’ The 
reds started as a voluntary supporters group, but soon joined by a great 
number of unsolicited supporters. During the games they shouted 
‘Daehanminguk’ (the Korean name of South Korea) passionately and 
innumerably. It looks like a burst of emotion suppressed during the 
economic crisis and a strong expression of national pride and patriotism 
(Joongang Ilbo, 2002).
However, we should also note the rise of cosmopolitanism alongside 
nationalism. Opening-up of the market to foreign goods allows 
consumers to choose from goods made in a variety of countries. People 
have increasingly been accustomed to foreign products, especially 
cultural products, and show little resistance to consume them. Especially 
young Koreans who were born and grew in more affluent and globalized 
years tend to be more cosmopolitan in their consumption behavior, while 
they actively participate in the nationalistic ‘reds.’ 
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This is an indication that their nationalism is not naked or blind one. 
In terms of popular culture, they no longer subscribe to, or respect, a 
popular culture item simply because it is of Western origin. Neither they 
like or consume all the Korean cultural products. Nationalism has 
provided them with opportunities to reevaluate imported Western 
culture as well as indigenous Korean or Asian culture. At the same time, 
as the sons and daughters of modernization and globalization, they have 
cultivated their own cultural tastes, acquired the ability to select among 
different ranges of quality, and been given the access to a wide variety 
of cultural products. 
In a sense they are dualistic in their inclination: ideologically they are 
more inclined to nationalism, but in terms of behavioral, especially 
consumption, patterns they are more cosmopolitan. And I think this 
dualism does not necessarily mean to be contradictory and ambivalent, 
but indicates a degree of differentiation between areas of everyday life, 
which is characteristic of modernity.   
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KOREAN CULTURE INDUSTRY 
As part of the liberalization policy, Korean government has begun to 
open up its cultural market to foreign influence since the mid 1980s, as 
discussed in the previous section. The economic crisis in 1997 led the 
government to further opening-up, because it began to see and 
emphasize the economic value of the culture and media industry.4 
Now, Korean cultural markets are wide open to foreign imports and 
influence, which has made the market more competitive. At the same 
time, the government allowed big corporations to enter into the culture 
industry which had long been protected from the intrusion of larger 
corporations. Thus domestic as well as transnational conglomerates have 
begun to invest in the Korean culture industry. The culture industry has 
also been supported greatly by the government’s industrial policies. The 
Korean government established for the first time the Culture Industry 
Bureau in the Ministry of Culture in 1994, and enacted the Culture 
Industry Promotion Act in 1999. Since then, promotion of culture 
industry has become one of the most important industrial strategies in 
4 It has recently been a world-wide trend that governments of many advanced countries 
actively promote the culture industry through policy initiatives, because it has become 
economically more and more important especially when it converges with information 
technology. In Korea rapid advancement of the IT industry in the late 1990s has greatly 
facilitated development of the culture and media industry. 
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Korea. These factors, that is, bigger investment, keener competition and 
strong government support, have transformed the Korean culture 
industry and popular culture in general, to a great extent. 
As a result of these changing conditions, Korean culture industry has 
grown rapidly. The market for culture industry has grown 21 percent 
annually for the period of 1999~2003, which is compared with the GDP 
growth rate of 6.1 percent for the same period (MCT, 2003: 28). The 
growth rate has been slowed a little bit since 2003. Still its annual growth 
rate for the period of 2003~2005 was 10.5 percent, almost twice that for 
the GDP (MCT, 2007: 23). The total sales of Korean culture industry as 
a whole in 2005 amount to 6.65 percent of GDP. Among the cultural 
industries, the publishing industry is the largest (35.9 percent in the total 
sales of the cultural industry as a whole in 2005), followed by the game 
industry (16.1 percent), the broadcasting industry (16.0 percent), the 
advertising industry (15.6 percent), the cinema industry (6.1 percent), the 
character industry (3.9 percent) and the music industry (3.3 percent) 
(MCT 2007: 23).
As the Korean cultural industry grows, it began to look outward, and 
international trade of cultural products between Korea and other 
countries has grown rapidly. For example, in 1990 Korea exported none 
of audio-visual and related services, but imported 80 million dollars of 
the services. International trade of the cultural products for Korea was 
minimal even in 1999, with the export of 8 million dollars and the import 
of 80 million dollars (MCT 2003: 70 Table II-2-1). But the total export 
of cultural products has grown to 631 million dollars in 2003, and 
doubled in 2005 to 1,236 million dollars. Likewise the import of cultural 
goods and services has increased greatly from 600 million dollars in 2003 
to 2,986 million dollars in 2005. Almost half of the export was from the 
game industry (45.7 percent) followed by publishing (15.5 percent), 
character (13.2), broadcasting (9.9 percent), animation (6.3 percent) and 
cinema (6.1 percent). But in terms of growth rate, the game industry is 
the highest, with its export grown 76.3 percent during the period of 
2003~2005, followed by broadcasting (70.1 percent), cinema (56.6 percent) 
and music (29.5 percent) (MCT 2007: 30 Table 2-1-5). We will look at 
some of these industries more closely in the following.      
Korean film industry has long been small and fragile, even though 
watching movies has been one of the most favorite pastimes for Koreans. 
However it has recently been rapidly growing qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively, due to such changes as rationalization of production 
system, stabilization of capital for production, continuous input of 
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qualified professionals, and investment of big corporations (Park, et al., 
2005). For example, the average production cost of a film has increased 
more than three times since 1997 from 1.3 billion Korean won (KRW, 
hereafter) in 1997 to 4.2 billion KRW in 2004. At the same time a few 
blockbusters costing more than 10 billion KRW have been made and 
successful in drawing a huge number of spectators. In fact the ratio of 
Korean film viewers to those for foreign, mostly American, films has 
changed dramatically: in 1996 it was 23 percent versus 77 percent, but 
it was reversed in 2003, to 53.5 percent versus 46.5 percent. It was for 
the first time in history that Korean audiences watched Korean films 
more than foreign ones. Also the share of Korean film in foreign markets 
has recently increased rapidly. Before 1995 the export of Korean film to 
foreign countries was minimal. But since 1998 it has increased drastically 
from less than five hundred thousand US dollars to more than 3 million 
dollars in 1998 and 30 million dollars in 2003, and 76 million dollars in 
2005. The exportation of Korean films is concentrated mostly in Asian 
markets, which account for sixty to eighty percents of the total exports. 
The chief importer of Korean films is Japan who imported about 80 
percent of the total export. Other Asian importers include Thailand, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and China (Choi, 2006; MCT, 2007: 229).
The TV drama industry provides another example for recent dramatic 
change. TV dramas have always been popular in Korea, so that major 
TV channels broadcast two or three dramas every day in the prime time. 
In the late 1990s the Korean media industry has begun to export its own 
dramas to other East Asian countries including China, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Vietnam, which have been well received by these 
countries. Since the early 2000s the Korean cultural products have not 
only been competing with the Japanese ones which have been present 
and dominant in these East Asian markets for a longer period, but also 
made an inroad into the Japanese market itself, creating the so-called 
‘Korean Wave’5 in this region.
It is ironic that Korean TV dramas have recently made a phenomenal 
hit in Japan, because most of the Korean TV programs have copied, or 
adopted Japanese products. Japan has obviously been the front runner 
in the popular culture market in this region. For example, Japanese TV 
dramas, especially so-called ‘trendy dramas,’ were very popular across 
East Asia in the latter half of 1990s. Since then, however, Korean trendy 
5 For discussions about ‘Korean Wave,’ see Cho et al (2003), Shin and Lee (2006), and 
Yoo et al (2005), among others. 
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dramas that are influenced by the Japanese ones began to occupy the 
media space in East and Southeast Asian countries, replacing the latter 
(Chua, 2004). This does not mean that Japanese influence in this region 
is all but disappeared. Japanese popular culture in East Asia has been 
present for long, and is still influential.
The music industry is immensely affected by development of digital 
technology. The traditional record market where LP, MC and CD are 
main items is rapidly declining since 2000, with the total sale reduced 
from 410 billion KRW in 2000 to 134 billion KRW in 2004. On the other 
hand the total sale of the digital music market including bell-sound 
download service, background music of mini home page service, and 
online music streaming service has increased five fold from 45 billion 
KRW in 2000 to 201 billion KRW in 2004. Likewise, international trade 
of music records has been diminishing since 2000. Korea exported about 
10.3 billion KRW of music records in 2000, but only 6 billion KRW in 
2004 (MCT, 2006: 250-255). The recent change in the music industry is 
often described as a paradigm shift from analogue to digital music, and 
from record-centered to source-centered. 
Paradigm shift is also detected in the styles and contents of popular 
music in Korea. Until the early 1990s, Korean popular songs were mostly 
Korean version of Japanese “enka” ballads and some rocks, and were 
heavily censored by the government. In 1992 a vocal group of three 
teenage boys, “Seo Taiji and Boys,” introduced a totally new styles of 
musical performance to the Korean audience, and made an immense 
success. Their music was basically rap mixed with elements of other 
styles; they danced while they sang; they wore baggy jeans and baseball 
caps which were very unusual for Korean singers; their music was 
designed for performance on the stage; lyrics of their songs were mostly 
about social issues rather than conventional love affair between man and 
woman; they used recent electronic technologies such as sampling 
techniques and synthesized accompaniments in their music (Howard, 
2002). 
In a sense Seo Taiji and Boys revolutionized Korean popular songs. 
Many music critics agree that their music has upgraded Korean popular 
songs at least a step forward. Their music not only opened the door to 
other styles of popular songs, such as hip hop, house, techno, and punk, 
but also paved the way for Korean pop stars to be able to compete with 
foreign singers in the international stages.
GLOBALIZATION, NATIONALISM, AND REGIONALIZATION 191
CHANGING PATTERNS OF CULTURAL CONSUMPTION AND THE 
RISE OF REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA
In the course of cultural globalization in Korea, not only cultural 
consumption itself has risen, but also its patterns have changed. Before 
the second phase of globalization, cultural consumption had to be limited 
due to lack of cultural capital, scarcity of economic means, and limited 
availability of cultural products. Up to the 1980s, the chief concern of 
most Koreans was economic wellbeing. Their consumption was dictated 
mostly by necessity, and their major activities in their leisure time were 
taking rest, watching TV, or hiking the mountains. Only few could enjoy 
cultural life and cultural activities.
But cultural concern becomes more and more important in everyday 
life for Koreans since the 1990s. This is most evident in the consumption 
behavior of the youth. Korean youth, like those in other advanced 
countries, tends to consume in order to acquire social distinction and 
identity (Lee, 2004; Son, 1997). They are the major consumers of cultural 
products, which are regarded as symbols of status and a means for 
recognition, When they choose among cultural products, their major 
criteria are fashion, design, color, brand name and quality, instead of 
price or quantity (Hwang, 2003). In other words, cultural capital is the 
determining factor for patterns of cultural consumption of the younger 
generation, in contrast to economic capital for the older generation 
(Chang, 2001).
In fact it is argued that cultural globalization is most visible in the 
youth culture because the youth are the most active recipient of cultural 
contents across national borders. Korean youth are a typical example. 
According to a sample survey conducted in 1999, a little less than half 
of the Korean youth favor foreign cultural products, and about three 
fourth of them would learn foreign language to get in touch with foreign 
popular culture. The nationalities of the cultural products they favor 
most were Japan (55.3%) and America (38.2%)(Lee, Maeng and Chung, 
2000: 140-48). But popular cultures from Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and 
other East Asian countries have increasingly penetrated into the Korea 
popular culture. At the same time the latter has been well received in 
these countries, since the late 1990s.
According to recent surveys, reasons for the Korean youth favoring 
foreign cultural products include “interesting,” “better quality,” and 
“more realistic (closer and more familiar)” (Lee, Maeng and Chung, 2000: 
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140; Yoon and Na, 2005a). Young Koreans consume cultural products 
mainly according to their own tastes, regardless of the products’ 
nationalities. They are also concern with such qualities of cultural 
products as refinement, creativity, individuality, and diversity. They 
used to find these qualities in American popular culture, but recently in 
Japan and other East Asian popular cultures as well. Many of them 
prefer cultural products from East Asian countries than from America, 
because the former is more familiar and realistic than the latter (Yoon 
and Na, 2005a: 17-18).
However, reception of foreign popular culture on the part of the 
Korean youth is neither straight nor without conflict. Due to the 
unhappy historical experience with Japan, those Korean youth who 
consume Japanese popular culture have to confront the dilemma between 
their nationalistic disposition and cultural preference. According to 
studies on Korean fans of Japanese popular culture, they adopt various 
strategies to cope with this dilemma, such as keeping distance, 
differentiation and segmentation (Kim, 2003; Yoon and Na, 2005a). They 
try to separate cultural tastes from historical context and ideological 
preference. Also many of the Korean fans of foreign popular culture 
perceive cultural choice as individual freedom, and establish, not 
necessarily knowingly, a new transnational cultural identity. They share 
with fans of other East Asian countries the same experience and emotion, 
and often regard themselves as global citizens or global cultural 
mediators (Yang, 2006).  
A similar trend can be detected in other East Asian countries. Korean 
popular culture has been exported to East and South East Asian 
countries including Japan, China, Taiwan and Vietnam, creating the 
so-called “Korean Wave.” Many studies try to offer explanations for this 
new phenomenon. For example, Japanese reception of Korean soap 
operas is interpreted as a nostalgic reaction to modern or postmodern 
Japan, where traditional Confucian family, primary relationship among 
people, and emotionally-charged behavior are hardly found or allowed 
(Chae and Yoon, 2006). On the other hand, Japanese fans of Korean 
popular songs and movies indicate that Korean cultural products are 
easy to understand, culturally close, and high in quality (Yoon and Na, 
2005b). However, audiences of China and other South-East Asian 
countries like Korean popular culture, because it is an indigenized 
Western culture with higher quality than their own (Gim, 2007; Lee et 
al., 2006; Han, 2005). In other words, Korean popular culture is popular 
in this region because it represents a new hybrid modernity mixing 
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Asian culture and Western culture. 
Along with Japan and Korea, other countries in this region, such as 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, have begun to export their own cultural 
products including movies, TV programs and popular music, mostly to 
the pan ethnic-Chinese segment of East Asia. As a result one can witness 
dense flows of cultural products among the East Asian countries, even 
though the American popular culture is still dominant in major urban 
centers in this region (Chua, 2004). 
The increasing circulation of popular culture within East Asia has been 
explained utilizing diverse concepts and factors. Some researchers 
propose two concepts, that is, cultural discount and cultural proximity, 
which emphasize cultural familiarity, geographical proximity and 
common Confucian cultural heritage (Yang, 2006; Chua, 2004; Son and 
Yang, 2003). Others suggest such factors as emergence of democratic 
governments, economic growth, expansion of consumption, and 
distribution of transnational media technology in this region (Yoon and 
Na, 2005a). Whatever the reasons, recent phase of globalization in East 
Asia is different from the previous one: there is an increasing circulation 
of popular culture within the region. And it seems to be evident that 
there emerges a common popular culture in this region, as Chua 
forcefully argues (Chua, 2004). In other words, regionalism seems to be 
a powerful response to globalization in East Asia. 
But there are disputes among scholars over the nature of the new 
Asian regional culture. For example, Koichi Iwabuchi and his colleagues 
argue that “(its) main feature is not Asian values or traditional culture 
but capitalist consumer/popular culture” (Iwabuchi, Muecke, and 
Thomas, 2004: 1). In his other book, Iwabuchi also claims that 
“theexperience of West-inflicted capitalist modernity has given birth to 
various modes of indigenized modernities, in such a way that they have 
become a source for the articulation of a new notion of Asian cultural 
commonality, difference and asymmetry” (Iwabuchi, 2002: 6). Cho 
Hanhyejeong also states that “the new culture consumed by Asian youth 
has been produced in the process of creating a new modernity out of 
mixing and hybridizing its own culture and Western and other Asian 
cultures” (Cho, et al., 2003: 5) It is true that the popular culture circulated 
in Asia is produced mostly by culture industry for commercial purpose, 
and in this sense it is a capitalist consumer culture. It is also true that 
popular cultures in the Asian region are mostly of American or Western 
origin, with a certain extent of indigenization or hybridization. 
However, the rise of nationalism, advancement of cultural modernization, 
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and the transnational cross-fertilization of popular culture among East Asian 
nations, which are facilitated by the recent process of globalization, have 
been critical in the formation of a new Asian popular culture. The result 
is not simply an indigenized copy of American culture, made suitable 
to “Asian tastes” (Iwabuchi, 2002: 19). The style and format maybe 
similar to American or Western one, but the content is increasingly filled 
with uniquely Asian, sometimes representing Asian values. Keith 
Howard makes this point clear in discussing new Korean popular songs: 
“while the stylistic origins of the new music may have been foreign, its 
content was clearly Korean, tied to an aesthetic of common experience, 
a shared understanding and appreciation of moŏt and mat (tastes and 
deliciousness), hŭng (ecstacy), and han (suffering and grief), framed by 
the terms uri nara (our country) and uri minjok (our people), and 
discussed within nationalistic discourse that maintains Koreans constitute 
a single homogeneous race” (Howard, 2002: 90). Shin also indicates that 
nationalism has been a leading theme of Korean popular music in 
particular and Korean popular culture in general, though nationalism in 
this case is in a more economic sense, to protect the Korean cultural 
market from foreign intrusion (Shin, 2005).  
According to case studies, Korean TV dramas are popular in Japan and 
other East Asian countries, because they promote traditional Confucian 
values such as filial piety and respect for the elderly, communitarian 
values, familism, romantic and platonic love, and also some aspects of 
the traditional Korean culture such as foods, fashions, and even emotions 
and sentiments (Yang, 2006; Lee et al., 2006; Han, 2005). In China, not 
only contents but also formats in TV game shows are made to fit into 
the local interests. According to Michael Keane (2004: 68), “Not only are 
cultural distinctions erased and massaged in the process of engineering 
a format that sells, but cultural specificity is retained in the process of 
cleaning the foreign of inappropriate elements.” Thus “it is possible to 
suggest that local content in East Asia has been reinvigorated by the 
presence of game ― and more recently reality game ― shows” (Keane, 
2004: 68).
From the above discussion it seems clear that the newly emerging 
regional culture in East Asian is culturally unique and historically novel. 
And it poses a challenge to Western popular culture and Western 
dominance of cultural globalization.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD ALTERNATIVE GLOBALIZATION
Since the fall of communist Eastern bloc in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, the Anglo-Saxon form of liberal capitalism has become a dominant 
ideological force, promoting aggressively free flows of goods and 
services across borders and boundaries in an effort to extend and 
consolidate its hegemony. However, this imperialist process of 
globalization has neither produced the homogenizing effect on global 
culture nor made Western culture dominating local cultures in Korea and 
other East Asian countries. Instead it has bred economic crisis in 1997, 
followed by the IMF-mandated structural reform in Korea, which, in 
turn, has instigated patriotism, concern with national identity, and 
nationalism. Nationalism has also been promoted by the so-called 
‘sunshine policy’ toward North Korea which aims at easing the tension 
between the North and the South Korea by increasing contacts and 
exchanges. 
The rise of nationalism has provided Koreans, especially younger 
generations, with an opportunity to take a critical look at imported 
Western culture as well as their own indigenous culture. At the same 
time they have acquired more cultural capital than older generations due 
to improved living conditions in their formative years. Thus they tend 
to consume popular culture according to their own tastes and 
considering its quality. They also tend to differentiate between their 
nationalistic ideology and cosmopolitan cultural consumption. 
The Korean culture industry has recently been transformed greatly by 
bigger investment, strong government support, and keener competition 
due to opening-up of cultural market to foreign imports. As a result, not 
only Korean consumers have more choices but also Korean cultural 
products have been more visible in East Asian markets, creating ‘Korean 
Wave.’ Exchanges of cultural products among other countries in this 
region, such as Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, have 
also surged dramatically, due to geographical and cultural proximity, 
development of new media technology including the internet, rising 
standard of living, and structural transformation of global capitalism.
The dense flow of popular culture among East Asian countries in 
recent years suggests an East Asian popular culture in the making. The 
East Asian popular culture initially represents as a hybrid modernity 
mixing Western and Asian cultures. But it seems to increasingly become 
a unique regional culture, distancing farther from the Western culture 
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and representing more of the Asian culture. If it is indeed the case, it 
could be a powerful globalizing force and influence on the Western 
culture as much as the latter has done on the East Asian one. In this 
sense the East Asian popular culture can be a possible candidate for 
alternative globalization, the concept which Peter Berger suggests, 
referring to the flow from the peripheral or non-Western countries to the 
West. 
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